Solving the Keogh Mystery

By Bob Snelson

While researching my newly published book, Death of a Myth, I was generously permitted, by the staff of the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, to visit the marker for Captain Myles Keogh. Captain Keogh was the commander of a three company battalion of the Seventh Cavalry during the Little Bighorn battle. The battalion consisted of Companies C, L, and I. Keogh’s battalion, along with a battalion (Co.’s E & F) under Captain George Yates, had accompanied Lt. Colonel George A. Custer to the northern end of the large Indian encampment.

Captain Keogh’s marker is one of approximately one hundred markers in a generally linear formation stretching from the top of Horse Holder’s Ravine to Custer Hill. Most of the markers are in a depression located on the northeast side of Battle Ridge. When viewing the area it is immediately obvious that it was completely unsuitable for a defensive position. The depression is surrounded by higher ground on three sides with a gradually sloping rise to the northwest.

While studying the Keogh sector of the battlefield, I found it quite curious that an experienced army officer such as Keogh would choose such a poor position in which to make his fight. I also found it inconceivable that he would choose it for a reserve position for Co. I. From the depression he would not have been able to view the situation with Co. L on Calhoun Hill or Co. C on Calhoun and Greasy Grass Ridges.

We know from the Crow scout, Curley, that Custer assigned at least a portion of Co. C to hold Calhoun Ridge when he maneuvered from the ford to Calhoun Hill. Co. L then formed a skirmish line on Calhoun Hill, supporting Co. C. Custer held a brief officers call behind Calhoun Hill, apparently deciding to leave Keogh to defend the area with his battalion. Custer continued on to the northwest with Captain Yates’ battalion. At this point Curley made his escape, leaving us with only the hostile warrior narratives and archeological evidence.

If we discount the notion that Keogh was foolish enough to place Company I in such a poor reserve or defensive position, we are left with just two remaining options. Either he was forced to retreat into the area or he deliberately attacked into it. Most warriors described the flow of the battle as a running fight from Calhoun Ridge to Calhoun Hill, and from there to the depression, and on to Custer Hill. Their statements suggest that he retreated into the area. However, most of the warriors were unaware that Custer had split his five companies into two battalions. They believed that the five companies had retreated together from Medicine Tail Ford to Custer Hill.

The most logical location for Keogh to place his reserve company would be on the southwest side of Battle Ridge. From this location they could protect the rear of both companies. They could also protect the left flank of L Co. When Companies C and L formed their skirmish lines they dismounted. Every fourth man became a horse holder, taking the horses to the rear for safety. Co. C placed their horses in Calhoun Coulee while Co. L placed theirs in Horse Holder’s Ravine.

Within minutes the warriors began crossing the river in greater numbers. They began to position themselves on the ridges to the northeast of Calhoun Hill and below the west side of Greasy Grass Ridge. The warriors quickly infiltrated the coulees and ravines to position themselves closer to the soldiers. It wasn’t long before the horse holders came under fire in Horse Holder’s Ravine. Keogh was forced to use his reserve to protect Co. L’s horses. He led his men into the depression and forced the infiltrating warriors to retreat back to the northeastern ridges.

Unfortunately for Keogh, the situation deteriorated too quickly for him to adjust. The warriors overran Co. C’s right flank at Greasy Grass Ridge. Within moments the skirmish line collapsed and more than twenty soldiers were killed on Greasy Grass and Calhoun Ridges. Another eight or nine died between Calhoun Ridge and Deep Ravine. The men who weren’t killed, fled in panic through Co. L’s skirmish line with the warriors right on their heels. Co. L attempted to change fronts quickly but were soon overwhelmed themselves. They too fled in terror over the hill, toward their horses and Keogh’s reserve company.

Before we judge the young soldiers too harshly we should place ourselves in their boots. Many of these men were in their first battle and had never seen a hostile warrior before. They went into battle expecting an easy victory over fleeing Indians. What they found instead were more than a thousand aggressive warriors wearing malicious looking war paint and brandishing extremely deadly weapons. When the situation got desperate they simply lacked the discipline to overcome their fear.

Making matters worse, Crazy Horse arrived on Battle Ridge via Deep Ravine. His warriors cut off the escape of the few soldiers attempting to run directly from Calhoun Hill to Custer Hill. Co. I and the remnants of the other two companies were now trapped in a gauntlet with the only opening to the northwest. The fight in the depression was conducted at close quarters, the soldiers and warriors fighting hand to hand.

Captain Keogh died surrounded by two of the three company First Sergeants and several other veterans. Many of the soldiers were killed in their attempt to flee toward Custer Hill, where Custer was taking up positions with Companies E and F. Few would make it to the tentative safety of Custer Hill. The fight in the Keogh sector lasted an astounding thirty minutes or less.